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ESSAY
Putting Voters First: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Citizen Sovereignty in
Federal Election Law
FRANCES R. HILL*
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.'
So begins the Constitution of the United States. Is this first sen-
tence of the Constitution an empty piety, devoid of meaning? If it is an
empty piety, why did the eminently practical framers choose this partic-
ular empty piety? If, on the other hand, this opening sentence has some
meaning in the constitutional scheme, what does it mean and why does it
matter? What does it mean to say that "[w]e the people . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution"? Does this sentence retain any constitu-
tional meaning today?
Dismissing the first sentence of the Constitution as an empty piety
becomes more difficult when one finds in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence the same concept. The second paragraph of the Declaration of
Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
* Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program in Taxation at the University of
Miami School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School (1984); Ph.D., Harvard University (1973). The
author wishes to thank the students in her Election Law Seminar at the University of Miami for
their insightful observations, and, not infrequently, disagreements with the author's view. She
also wishes to thank David Marshall for his outstanding research assistance during the 2004-05
academic year.
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that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happi-
ness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.'
The concluding paragraph of the Declaration of Independence asserts
that the assembly acted "in the Name, and by Authority of the good
People of these Colonies."3 Similarly, in his Gettysburg Address, Presi-
dent Lincoln described our system of government as "government of the
people, by the people, for the people . . . ."I If these are all empty
pieties, why do they recur in our history?
The idea that the Constitution begins with an empty piety is incon-
sistent with the idea that it is "we the people" who ratified the Constitu-
tion. This process of ratification by the people was seen, at the time the
Constitution was written, as an unprecedented and unique contribution
to democratic theory and practice, emanating from the practical experi-
ence of the recently liberated colonies. Provision for amendment of the
Constitution through a process of ratification by the people of the states
is also inconsistent with the idea that the opening sentence of the Consti-
tution is an empty piety.5
This essay suggests that the first sentence of the Constitution is in
fact the foundational social contract of American democracy. Ours is a
representative democracy based on the consent of ordinary people. Con-
sent is not merely symbolic or metaphoric, nor is it limited to the initial
ratification of the Constitution. The first sentence of the Constitution
defines the concept of citizen sovereignty and assigns citizens the role of
constituting legitimate government authority.
Citizens fill this constitutional role through their consent, which is
expressed by voting for candidates in elections. The concept of consent
as suggested by the first sentence of the Constitution is not limited to the
single act of ratifying the Constitution, but rather is a process of continu-
ing consent, expressed through continuing participation. Such participa-
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. Id. para. 32. For an interpretation of the Declaration of Independence treating the consent
of ordinary people as the source of government authority, see PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997).
4. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at http://
www.ushistory.org/documents/gettysburg.htm.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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tion is the foundation of representative government. Electoral
participation constitutes government authority by holding elected repre-
sentatives accountable. Citizens exercise this constitutionally-defined
constitutive role not as isolated individual voters whose only role is to
cast a ballot, but instead as active participants with rights to associate
with each other and with their representatives in a dynamic and continu-
ing process.
The idea that legitimate government requires the consent of the
governed was, at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitu-
tion, a radical and transformative idea.6 Eventually, however, consent
theories became the dominant political theory. The idea of the consent
of the governed as the source of legitimate government authority took
many forms. What consent means, how it is to be expressed, and
whether it is a one-time event or an ongoing process were all matters of
profound difference among consent theorists. These questions remain
matters in dispute to this day and show no sign of resolution.
The idea that the continuing consent of ordinary voters is a consti-
tutional role that constitutes continuing legitimate government authority
plays virtually no role in election law jurisprudence or scholarship. It is
hardly surprising that the most immediate response to the debacle that
was the 2000 presidential election was an intensified interest in issues of
voter protection and electoral integrity. The necessity of defending the
integrity of United States elections is rightly a matter of grave concern
and requires ongoing practical vigilance and reform. The profound
issues concerning federalism and the balance of powers that lie at the
heart of the conduct of elections for president, vice president, and mem-
bers of Congress also came into sharp focus in 2000.7 These issues have
not yet been addressed in light of the role of voters in constituting legiti-
mate government authority.
If the first sentence of the Constitution has meaning, then elections
are the mechanism through which the people fulfill their constitutional
role. Conceptualizing voting and elections as part of the constitutional
structure through which voters play a continuing role of constituting
legitimate government authority raises questions that have received little
attention. What does election law look like if elections are seen as con-
stitutive? What does election law look like if it is based on putting vot-
6. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5-10 (2005).
7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), is a seminal case not because it is necessarily correct,
but because it illuminates the intersection of federalism and balance of powers with the conduct of
elections. The jurisprudential implications of this case are likely to be explored in both litigation
and scholarship for a considerable time to come.
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ers where the Constitution puts voters? What does election law look like
if election law is based on putting voters first?
The Constitution provides for a representative democracy, not a
populist direct democracy. Does this distinction limit the force of the
idea of citizen sovereignty? Are citizens any less sovereign because
they vote in candidate elections to choose representatives rather than in
plebiscites to approve or reject particular policy proposals? If voting is
the means through which citizens exercise their sovereignty under the
Constitution, what are elections? Why do we hold elections and what
roles do voters play in them? It is illusory to think that we have satisfac-
tory answers to these questions.
Of course, one purpose of elections is to choose from among candi-
dates for public office. Voters cast ballots that, if counted honestly,
make that choice. However, conceptualizing campaigns as costly public
job interviews and elections as hiring decisions puts candidates and the
interests that fund them at the center of an analytic construct of elec-
tions. In contrast, conceptualizing elections as expressions of consent
that reflect a constitutive act establishing legitimate government author-
ity puts voters at the center of governance as the source of legitimate
sovereign authority, and thus at the center of any analytic construct of
elections. Voters constitute legitimate government authority and do so
through selection from among candidates in elections.
This essay explores what putting voters first would mean for elec-
tion law jurisprudence. It highlights questions that are only rarely
raised, and certainly not answered, in contemporary discourse relating to
election law and considers the implications of those questions. The
essay begins with a discussion of what it means to put voters first; what
is meant by a constitutive role for the people, as exercised through vot-
ing in candidate elections instead of in ballot measure referenda. It then
asks what the Constitution says about voting and elections if read liter-
ally, and goes on to explore the early voting rights jurisprudence that
addressed the absence of a textual basis for a right to vote. The next two
sections apply the construct of constitutive consent to issues in cam-
paign finance law and the design of associations for constitutive consent.
The essay concludes with some thoughts on the development of a princi-
pled, pragmatic theory of democracy based on putting voters first.
I. PUTTING VOTERS FIRST: AN ANALYTIC CONSTRUCT
Putting voters first means recognizing that voters have a fundamen-
tal role in constituting legitimate government authority through the
expression of consent. Voters fulfill this role by casting votes for candi-
dates in elections. The question is how the election of representatives
[Vol. 60:155
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ensures that government authority is and remains legitimate. In what
sense and through what means does voting in elections constitute con-
sent? How does this form of consent ensure that representative govern-
ment is democratic government?
Consent is an expression of active engagement in public life. Con-
sent is expressed through and measured by the scope and quality of par-
ticipation, representation, and association. A complete consideration of
the dimensions and implications of these elements of consent is far
beyond the scope of this essay. Any analysis of consent begins by
understanding that participation, representation, and association depend
on structures and processes for the expression of consent. Contempo-
rary controversies over redistricting and gerrymandering, over voter pro-
tection and election integrity, over the financing of election campaigns,
and over the appropriate election roles of various types of entities and
whether they are treated as political committees subject to the require-
ments of federal election law all implicate fundamental questions of par-
ticipation, representation, and association.
If consent is necessary to constitute legitimate government author-
ity, then consent and the withholding of consent become the primary
means of holding government accountable for its actions. There can be
no legitimacy unless government is accountable. Accountability is not
simply a response to crises or abuses, but rather is a feature of the rou-
tine conduct of the public policy process. It depends on an active rela-
tionship of representation between the official and the voters who
elected him or her. However, voters are not very effective at monitoring
public policy processes as individuals. Voters become much more
effective monitors of public policy processes when they form associa-
tions, including political parties and other advocacy associations of their
choice. For this reason, participation within such structures is important
to both representation and accountability, and putting voters first raises
questions about their roles in political parties and other political associa-
tions. What scope do voters have for participation? What associational
rights are implicated in claims relating to the operation of such
organizations?
Because elections are the means through which consent is
expressed, it is centrally important to define the range of activities impli-
cated in the concept of an election. An election encompasses not only
the casting of ballots, but also the campaign leading up to that event.
Putting voters first means ensuring that voters have the information they
need about all aspects of the campaign, including funding sources.
Additionally, voters have legitimate interests in the structure of districts
20061
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in legislative elections. This is not a matter in which it should be consti-
tutionally permissible to put candidates or political parties first.
The idea of putting voters first based on their constitutional role as
the source of government authority is akin to Justice Breyer's concept of
"active liberty." 8 In his book, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Demo-
cratic Constitution, the theme of which he describes as "democracy and
the Constitution,"9 Justice Breyer describes the concept of "active lib-
erty" as "an active and constant participation in collective power."'" He
concludes that active liberty depends on a "sharing of a nation's sover-
eign authority among its people."" Such a sharing of sovereign author-
ity means that "it should be possible to trace, without much difficulty, a
line of authority for the making of governmental decisions back to the
people themselves" and that "the people themselves should participate in
government-though their participation may vary in degree."' 2 In addi-
tion, "the people, and their representatives, must have the capacity to
exercise their democratic responsibilities."' 3 Justice Breyer summarizes
his concept of active liberty as follows:
When I refer to active liberty, I mean to suggest connections of this
kind between the people and their government-connections that
involve responsibility, participation, and capacity. Moreover, active
liberty cannot be understood in a vacuum, for it operates in the real
world. And in the real world, institutions and methods of interpreta-
tion must be designed in a way such that this form of liberty is both
sustainable over time and capable of translating the people's will into
sound policies.14
Justice Breyer does not simply assert that active liberty defines a
desirable system; he also asserts that it is grounded in the history of the
Constitution.' 5 He concludes that the Constitution "created a govern-
mental structure that reflected the view that sovereign authority
originated in the people." 6 With respect to the constitutional history of
the United States and its representative democracy, Justice Breyer states:
"In sum, our constitutional history has been a quest for workable gov-
8. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 21-34. This chapter begins with a question and a clear answer: "Is it reasonable
from a historical perspective to view the Constitution as centrally focused upon active liberty,
upon the right of individuals to participate in democratic self-government? I believe so." Id.
16. Id. at 22.
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ernment, workable democratic government, workable democratic gov-
ernment protective of individual personal liberty. Our central
commitment has been to 'government of the people, by the people, for
the people.' "117
It is hardly surprising that Justice Breyer applies this interpretation
to campaign finance as well as to certain forms of commercial speech.
His point is that these cases "show the importance of reading the First
Amendment not in isolation but as seeking to maintain a system of free
expression designed to further a basic constitutional purpose: creating
and maintaining democratic decision-making institutions."' 8
II. VOTING AND ELECTIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION
What does the Constitution say about elections, the terms on which
they are to be conducted, and their consequences within the constitu-
tional framework? Does the Constitution provide for a right to vote?
For textualists, the disconcerting answer would have to be that the Con-
stitution does not say very much at all about elections. It does not pro-
vide for an express right to vote; nor does it refer at all to the
consequences of elections. The Constitution provides that certain
offices are to be filled by elections, and attempts to resolve the difficult
issues of federalism implicated by the election of state representatives to
the United States Congress.' 9 This is an unsatisfactory answer.
The Constitution's lacunae regarding elections and voting have had
the practical consequence of creating uncertainty about the constitutional
protections available to the various participants in elections, and about
the three major elements in what has become a discrete field of election
law-redistricting, campaign finance, and voter protection. Since there
17. Id. at 34.
18. Id. at 39.
19. As is clear from Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, the purpose of
convening the Constitutional Convention was to remedy the infirmities of the Articles of
Confederation, the chief infirmity of which was the absence of an effective national government.
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON (W.W.
Norton & Co. ed. 1987). Controversies over structuring this new federal government were made
more difficult by the division of the country into slave states and states where slavery played no
important economic role. This division was reflected in the "three-fifths" compromise that
allocated representatives in the House of Representatives based on counting slaves as three-fifths
of a person. The debate over this provision extended over a full week, from July 6, 1787 through
July 12, 1787. Id. at 245-82. These intertwined issues featured prominently in the defense of the
new Constitution as it faced ratification by the voters. The link between representation in the
House of Representatives and slavery is the particular focus of what is now known as Number 54
in the Federalist Papers. Number 55 identifies the issue of the number of representatives in the
House of Representatives as the most controversial issue in the ratification debates. The issue of
representation in the House of Representatives is the focus of Numbers 54-58, and the issue of
having equal representation of large and small states in the Senate is addressed in Numbers 61-66.
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are so few directly relevant clauses, claims relating to the conduct of
elections are based on the Constitution's more general provisions. The
issue, which has been identified only recently, is whether making claims
under these clauses in the context of elections means that jurisprudence
developed in cases addressing other issues must be applied literally and
fully.2
Determining that First Amendment or Equal Protection jurispru-
dence is invariable and inviolable is to assert that the rights thereunder
are absolute and independent of the need to balance considerations dif-
ferently in different contexts or different cases presenting different facts.
However, determining that First Amendment or Equal Protection juris-
prudence does permit recalibration reflecting different contexts and
case-specific fact patterns raises the thorny question of the parameters of
such adjustments and balances. The core dispute has been over the
application of First Amendment jurisprudence in campaign finance
cases. Concerns that these cases are eroding more general First Amend-
ment jurisprudence are linked to concerns that democracy requires abso-
lute protections for political speech. It is interesting, if not entirely
coherent, that proponents of absolute speech rights express less certainty
over absolute associational rights.
These issues relating to conventional election law claims may be
more coherently resolved by grounding election law jurisprudence in the
first sentence of the Constitution. In so doing, voters would join candi-
dates, contributors, and political parties as persons with constitutionally-
defined and protected roles in elections. Through active, constitution-
ally-defined participation by citizens, elections create legitimate govern-
ment authority with requisite consent. This framework defines a
distinctive balance among these various interests in the context of elec-
tions and grounds this balance in the text of the Constitution, which
mandates putting voters first. This was a radical step in 1787, and it
may be radical today, but this was not always the case.
Ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution after the Civil War set in motion controversies over voting
rights that caused the Court to consider the Constitutional predicate for
voting rights and the role of voting and elections in the Constitutional
scheme. In the wake of the Civil War, the Court well understood that
claims attempting to limit the role of Congress in defining conditions
regulating voting and the conduct of elections for members of Congress
were challenges to the very existence of a national government. In a
20. The most direct discussion of this foundational issue appears in Justice Breyer's
concurrence and Justice Kennedy's dissent in Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000). See discussion infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
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case involving stuffing of ballot boxes, the Court upheld the applicabil-
ity of a federal statute imposing sanctions on state officials who engaged
in election fraud.2 1 In deciding this case to uphold the authority of Con-
gress and deny relief from the sanctions imposed under a federal statute,
the Court observed:
The greatest difficulty in coming to a just conclusion arises from
mistaken notions with regard to the relations which subsist between
the State and national governments. It seems to be often overlooked
that a national constitution has been adopted in this country, estab-
lishing a real national government therein, operating upon persons
and territory and things; and which, moreover, is, or should be, as
dear to every American citizen as his State government is.
22
The Court held that the national government "must execute its powers,
or it is no government.
23
In protecting the rights of former slaves to vote, the Court took
strong and clear positions on the role of voting and the authority of Con-
gress to enact statutes that elaborated these rights and to impose sanc-
tions, including criminal penalties, on persons attempting to interfere
with the exercise of these rights.24 These cases provide clear evidence
that the Court viewed voters' role in governance and the role of consent
as the source of legitimate government authority as self-evident Consti-
tutional truths that did not require any reference to explicit Constitu-
tional language.
The Court in Ex parte Yarbrough25 could not have been more direct
in dismissing the idea that voting rights exist only if a voter can point to
an explicit Constitutional clause. The Court observed:
That a government whose essential character is republican,
whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose
most numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by
the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this
21. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
22. Id. at 393-94.
23. Id. at 396.
24. The question of the authority of Congress to enact statutes regulating the conduct of
federal elections remains an important question in contemporary election law cases. The Court in
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), addressed this issue throughout its opinion and affirmed
congressional authority to enact statutes relating to campaign finance. Citing Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), the Court in McConnell stated:
Many years ago we observed that "[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard ... an election from the improper use of money
to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self
protection." We abide by that conviction in considering Congress' most recent
effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24.
25. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is
a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest
consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is
superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect
the elections on which its existence depends from violence and
corruption.
If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great
natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and
insidious corruption.26
The Court did not find the right to vote simply an individual right,
but a matter constituting legitimate authority, reasoning:
[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise this
right freely .... This duty does not arise solely from the interest of
the party concerned, but from the necessity of the government itself,
that its service shall be free from the adverse influence of force and
fraud practised on its agents, and that the votes by which its members
of Congress and its President are elected shall be the free votes of the
electors, and the officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted choice
of those who have the right to take part in that choice.27
The Court found no reason to elaborate on the argument that the
existence of the general government depends on elections. Instead, the
Court took the proposition as self-evident and addressed the more con-
troversial issue of the absence of an explicit reference to the right to vote
in the text of the Constitution. The Court rejected textual literalism and
relied instead on the doctrine of inherent powers, reasoning:
The proposition that it has no such power is supported by the old
argument often heard, often repeated, and in this court never assented
to, that when a question of the power of Congress arises the advocate
of the power must be able to place his finger on words which
expressly grant it. . . . It destroys at one blow, in construing the
Constitution of the United States, the doctrine universally applied to
all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of
the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application
to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any
other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put
into words all derivative powers-a difficulty which the instrument
itself recognizes by conferring on Congress the authority to pass all
laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers
expressly granted and all other powers vested in the government or
26. Id. at 657-58.
27. Id. at 662.
[Vol. 60:155
PUTTING VOTERS FIRST
any branch of it by the Constitution. Article I, sec. 8, clause 18.28
The Court concluded that it is not correct to say "that the right to vote
for a member of Congress is not dependent upon the Constitution or
laws of the United States . ,.9 The right to vote is not only conferred
by the United States Constitution, but is also "essential to the healthy
organization of the government itself."30 The Court held:
It is as essential to the successful working of this government
that the great organisms of its executive and legislative branches
should be the free choice of the people, as that the original form of it
should be so.... In a republican government, like ours, where politi-
cal power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the peo-
ple, chosen at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to
control these elections by violence and by corruption is a constant
source of danger.
31
The Court applied the reasoning developed in Yarbrough in numer-
ous other cases in which voters claimed that their constitutionally
defined and protected voting rights had been denied. The Court held
that voters have a right to have their votes counted, stating that "[w]e
regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote
counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot
in a box."' 32 The Court held that voters' rights in primary elections, not
just in general elections, are grounded in the Constitution and thus may
be protected by legislation enacted by Congress.33
In this line of cases, the Court put the voters first and protected the
constitutional scheme based on the consent of the voters. The more
recent history of election law jurisprudence can be understood as a
struggle to ensure that this framework once again serves to put voters
first in our understanding of representative democracy.
III. PUTTING VOTERS FIRST IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
Historically, campaign finance jurisprudence has been consumed
with the contributors' and candidates' constitutional rights while largely
ignoring or discounting the rights of voters. Indeed, elections them-
selves have been largely ignored in the jurisprudence of campaign
finance. Buckley v. Valeo 34 marks the most complete development of
28. Id. at 658.
29. Id. at 659.
30. Id. at 666.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915).
33. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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this approach, while McConnell v. FEC3 5 marks the beginning of a reas-
sessment. If money is speech, what is voting? If contributors and candi-
dates have inviolable rights under the First Amendment, what
constitutional rights do voters have and what claims can they bring when
those rights are violated? To the extent that voting is treated as a right, it
is treated as an abstract right unrelated to other rights. or to the nature of
American government.
Concern over corruption and the appearance of corruption is not a
recent development. Indeed, in Yarbrough, the Court expressed its con-
cern over "the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics,
open violence and insidious corruption."36 Referring to the violence
against African-American voters at issue in the case, the Court went on
to observe:
If the recurrence of such acts as these prisoners stand convicted
of are too common in one quarter of the country, and give omen of
danger from lawless violence, the free use of money in elections,
arising from the vast growth of recent wealth in other quarters,
presents equal cause for anxiety.
If the government of the United States has within its constitu-
tional domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very
sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by
violence and outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the
country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes
which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are at the mercy of
the combinations of those who respect no right but brute force, on the
one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other.37
The Court relied on the reasoning in Yarbrough to uphold the appli-
cation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 192538 to the selection of
members to the Electoral College in Burroughs v. United States.39 In
Burroughs, two "political committee" officials who accepted contribu-
tions and made expenditures in connection with the selection of presi-
dential and vice-presidential electors were charged with failing to keep
records required under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, and with con-
spiring to avoid the Act's requirements.40 The constitutional issue was
whether the political committee officials could be charged under the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, or whether Congress was without power
to regulate the selection of members of the Electoral College, because
35. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
36. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
37. Id. at 667.
38. Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (incorporated into the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 20 (1972)).
39. 290 U.S. 534, 544-47 (1934).
40. Id. at 543.
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that selection rested exclusively with the states.4 The Court held that
members of the Electoral College are not federal officials, but:
[T]hey exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties in vir-
tue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The
importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to
and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be
too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the
improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation
in a vital particular the power of self-protection. Congress, undoubt-
edly, possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential
to preserve the departments and institutions of the general govern-
ment from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or
by corruption.42
Two ideas have dominated the discourse over campaign finance
prior to McConnell. The first is the idea that money is speech and the
second is that money flows naturally like water, and its movement
neither can nor should be redirected. These two concepts have been
captured in a "hydraulic" metaphor that argues, quite oddly, that money,
like water, cannot be controlled and, in consequence, should not be con-
trolled.43 The analogy to water belies any familiarity with water or the
process by which it moves from underground to a glass or pitcher in
one's home or any familiarity with rivers, streams, or irrigation ditches.
Water sometimes moves freely, but only when its movement is consis-
tent with gravity. Water encountering resistance or moving against
gravity must be pumped. Political money is extracted from the pockets
of large donors like water is pumped out of underground wells, and it is
moved through a series of routes no more natural than the water projects
constructed at great cost by the Corps of Engineers. Political money is
pumped by a bipartisan political class of officeholders assisted by the
functional equivalent of the Corps of Engineers, a small army of lawyers
and political operatives who move the money with the same awesome
effort that Joan Didion described in her essay on moving the water in the
American West.44
41. Id. at 544-45.
42. Id. at 545.
43. This hydraulic metaphor is derived from Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1999). For an elegant rejoinder,
see Daniel R. Ortiz, Water, Water Everywhere, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1739 (1999) (hydraulic metaphor
might be descriptive but cannot be normative because it ignores the "hydraulics of influence,"
which Ortiz insightfully observes is the focus of most reform efforts).
44. See Joan Didion, At the Dam, in THE WHrrE ALBUM 197-200 (1990). Didion describes a
visit to Hoover Dam and describes the image of isolated power used for purposes that no longer
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This Herculean effort by the political class to pump political money
has accorded voters virtually no role. Most voters do not participate in
funding elections, do not participate in the structures through which the
money is moved and ultimately spent, have only limited opportunities
for active association through political parties or other entities that shape
political discourse, and, in consequence, have little in the way of respon-
sive representation. Consequently, the question is not why so few voters
make campaign contributions, but rather, why so few candidates seek
contributions from ordinary voters and how candidates' preference for
large contributions from relatively few contributors impacts campaign
finance and election law jurisprudence, as well as the operation of repre-
sentative democratic government. Neither of these questions even arose
in Buckley."
A. Leaving the Voters Out: The Jurisprudence of Buckley v. Valeo
The plaintiffs in Buckley included no voters, but rather were com-
prised of several candidates and political parties.4 6 To what extent, if
any, the absence of plaintiff-voters shaped the Court's perspective on the
claims cannot be determined with any certainty. One might conclude
that it had no meaningful effect at all. Nonetheless, the Court begins
with the ringing declaration that "[i]n a republic where the people are
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.
'4 7
For this reason, the First Amendment protects both political speech and
political association. As the Court observed, "[d]iscussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitu-
tion."48 Yet, this rhetoric quickly gives way to concern for the rights of
contributors to contribute and the rights of candidates and political par-
ties to spend. To the extent voters are considered at all, they are men-
tioned as passive consumers of the speech provided to them through the
seem compelling or even justifiable, the entire enterprise seeming like "a dynamo finally free of
man, splendid at last in its absolute isolation, transmitting power and releasing water to a world
where no one is." Id. at 200. Didion's attraction to the power inherent in moving the water
throughout her native state of California is captured in Holy Water. Id. at 59-66. The analogies to
the repulsion and fascination with the power deployed to move political money has yet to find its
own Joan Didion to explore the connection between moving the political money and its resonance
in elemental human fascination with power. Like Hoover Dam, this system, too, seeks to free
itself from the interests of ordinary people or ordinary voters.
45. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1979).
46. See id.
47. Id. at 14-15.
48. Id. at 14.
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combined effect of contributions and the expenditure decisions made by
candidates and political parties. This Court-envisioned role is far from
that of voters as active participants whose constitutional role is to consti-
tute legitimate government authority, as discussed in Yarbrough and
Burroughs.
In Buckley, the Court upheld limits on campaign contributions, but
struck down the limits on campaign expenditures.49 In so holding, the
Court chose candidates over contributors and ignored voters. The Court
concluded that a limit on contributions "entails only a marginal restric-
tion upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication."5
The Court reasoned that contributions are not really speech at all, or at
least not as fully speech as expenditures:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the can-
didate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis
for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor
does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since
the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very
rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candi-
date. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a
candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint
on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expres-
sion of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way
infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the trans-
formation of contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the contributor.
51
The Court observed that contribution limitations "could have a
severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candi-
dates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary
for effective advocacy. '52 The Court concluded that the contribution
limitations in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971,1 3 as
amended in 1974, 54 did not have such an adverse impact, but instead:
[R]equire[d] candidates and political committees to raise funds from
a greater number of persons and to compel people who would other-
49. Id. at 58-59.
50. Id. at 20-21.
51. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000 &
Supp. 2002)).
54. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455).
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wise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend
such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the
total amount of money potentially available to promote political
expression.55
The Court neglected to discuss the implications of its predicted result.
Instead, the Court focused exclusively on the amount of money and the
amount of speech, not the number or identities of contributors.
FECA imposed limitations on expenditures by candidates and on
independent expenditures by persons not related to or coordinating their
expenditures with candidates. 56 The Court struck down the limitation on
expenditures on the grounds that such limitations reduce the quantity of
speech. The Court reasoned:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.57
In its analysis of the FECA limitations, the Court used rationales
potentially applicable to independent expenditures to argue that expendi-
tures by candidates and their political parties should not be regulated.
The Court's difficulty arises from its tortured efforts to explain why and
how contributions might foster corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion while expenditures would not. The Court found itself in the posi-
tion of upholding limited public funding of-presidential campaigns while
at the same time uncritically accepting the idea that the expenditure limi-
tations were merely an ill-advised effort to limit the cost of elections.58
The Court reasoned:
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that
spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or
unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government, but the people-individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political committees-who must
retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues
in a political campaign.59
In a footnote, the Court obliquely acknowledges the inconsistency
between this sweeping assertion and its decision upholding the FECA
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).




provision on public financing of presidential campaigns.6 °
The major difficulty with the Court's reasoning is that it ignores the
constitutive role of voters in elections and in campaigns. Instead, the
Court conflates the rights of candidates and parties and political commit-
tees with the rights of voters, and uses the rights more appropriately
reserved for voters to defend the preference the Court gives to candi-
dates and parties and other political committees. In effect, voters appear
in Buckley primarily to provide a rationale for the rights guaranteed to
candidates.
What would change if the Court put voters first by taking the first
sentence of the Constitution seriously? Taking account of voters' con-
stitutional role in legitimizing government authority would require one
to recognize that voters have a stake in the conduct of campaigns, and to
view campaigns as a conceptual extension of elections. In practice, this
would mean that the voters' rights to speak during the campaign would
become as important as the candidates' rights to speak. The relationship
between money and speech in elections would be assessed in terms of
the range of opinions given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Vot-
ers' rights to speak would include voters' rights to hear political
messages responsive to their concerns. Candidates' tactical considera-
tions would not be able to trump voters' interests in communication and
information.
Using the aggregate amount of speech as measured by the amount
of money spent, which was the approach used in Buckley, would no
longer suffice. The distinction between contributions and expenditures
would be analyzed in terms of its practical impact on voters. Affording
greater constitutional protection to making expenditures than to making
contributions would be seen for what it is-a means of putting control of
political speech in the hands of a political class and its big-money back-
ers and, in the process, excluding voters from any active role in election
campaigns. Because voters are currently reduced to the role of respond-
ing to highly structured and limited choices, the meaning of representa-
tion is attenuated. Issues of corruption and the appearance of corruption
are issues of the quality of participation, association, and representation.
This is to say, excluding voters from campaigns undermines the mean-
ing of consent in constituting legitimate government authority.
These themes were the core of election law jurisprudence before
60. Id. at 57 n.65 ("Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may
condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified
expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he
chooses to accept, he may decide to forego private fundraising and accept public funding.").
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Buckley. Two subsequent cases represent efforts to reincorporate these
themes into the campaign finance jurisprudence.
B. Beginning to Include the Voters in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC
The Court considered a challenge to limits on campaign contribu-
tions in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.6 1 In Nixon, a Mis-
souri state political action committee and a candidate in a party primary
for a state office challenged state campaign contribution limits, which
were stricter than those approved in Buckley. Finding that Buckley con-
trolled, the Court upheld the state contribution limitations.62 The major-
ity opinion invokes concern over corruption and the appearance of
corruption: "Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance. 63
Nixon is significant because it sharpened the issues in campaign
finance jurisprudence. At one level, the opinion could be read as a sim-
ple application of Buckley. At another level, the reasoning in the con-
currences and dissents amplifies the real issues at stake.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens asserts that "[m]oney is prop-
erty; it is not speech."'64 He made the distinction between acting in one's
own capacity and hiring others to act for one:
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multi-
tude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a
football field. Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired labor-
ers to perform the same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the
First Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the use
of money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas
to achieve the same results.65
Justice Stevens did not claim that his refusal to treat money as speech
meant that the use of money in politics was afforded no constitutional
protection. Rather, he reasoned: "The right to use one's own money to
hire gladiators, or to fund 'speech by proxy,' certainly merits significant
constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not enti-
tled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases."66
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, took issue with the dis-
sent's claim that the majority opinion undermined the First Amendment
61. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
62. Id. at 395-98.
63. Id. at 390.
64. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Id. (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 399.
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rights of speech and association. 67 Justice Breyer asserted that the dis-
sent by Justice Thomas "takes a difficult constitutional problem and
turns it into a lopsided dispute between political expression and govern-
ment censorship. 68  Justice Breyer argued that conventional First
Amendment jurisprudence cannot resolve such an issue, reasoning:
[T]his is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both
sides of the legal equation. For that reason there is no place for a
strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought
to accompany the words "strict scrutiny." Nor can we expect that
mechanical application of the tests associated with "strict scrutiny"-
the tests of "compelling interests" and "least restrictive means"-will
properly resolve the difficult constitutional problem that campaign
finance statutes pose.69
For Justice Breyer, "a decision to contribute money to a campaign
is a matter of First Amendment concern-not because money is speech
(it is not); but because it enables speech."7 The speech and associa-
tional rights implicated in this action must be balanced against two other
constitutionally-protected interests, which Justice Breyer identified as
protecting the integrity of elections and democratizing electoral partici-
pation.7 Justice Breyer treated both of these considerations as matters
of governance, not simply as matters of formalistic or formulaic equal-
ity. Protecting the integrity of the electoral process matters because the
electoral process is "the means through which a free society democrati-
cally translates political speech into concrete governmental action."72
Justice Breyer also identified another interest furthered by statutory
limits on contributions, namely democratizing the influence of political
money. He reasoned:
[B]y limiting the size of the largest contributions, such restrictions
aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear
upon the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to build public
confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate's
meaningful financial support, encouraging the public participation
and open discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes.73
To the extent that Buckley might be read to suggest that democratization
of political money is constitutionally impermissible, Justice Breyer sig-
naled that he would be willing to "reinterpret aspects of Buckley," as
67. See id. at 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 399.
69. Id. at 400.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 400-01.
72. Id. at 401.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
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required by the Constitution.74 However, Justice Breyer thought that
Buckley "might be interpreted as embodying sufficient flexibility for the
problem at hand."75
The dissents in Nixon both attacked the majority for improperly
applying First Amendment doctrine in the case. Justice Kennedy
accused the majority of seeming "almost indifferent" to the lasting
impact of their articulated standard of review, and disparaged the hold-
ing as "a cavalier dismissal of the petitioners' claim."'7 6 He admonished
the majority: "The Court is concerned about voter suspicion of the role
of money in politics. Amidst an atmosphere of skepticism, however, it
hardly inspires confidence for the Court to abandon the rigors of our
traditional First Amendment structure. 77
Justice Kennedy focused on what he saw as the unfortunate conse-
quences of the Court's distinction between contributions and expendi-
tures in Buckley, charging that the Court had created conditions for
"covert speech" that "mocks the First Amendment. '78 Specifically, "[a
system of covert speech funded by unlimited soft money] creates dan-
gers greater than the one it has replaced. '79 The first danger is that con-
tributors and candidates "mask their real purpose" by claiming that
speech intended to influence the outcome of elections is instead issue
advocacy.80 This leads to the second danger, which is that "we have an
indirect system of accountability that is confusing, if not dispiriting, to
the voter."8 Justice Kennedy also stated that he agreed with much of
Justice Thomas' reasoning, but that he wanted to leave open the possi-
bility that either Congress or a state legislature might devise a system
limiting both contributions and expenditures without violating the
requirements of the First Amendment.82
Justice Kennedy's dissent is based largely on the First Amendment
and its proper application to campaign finance cases. He mentions vot-
ers not at all and "the people" only twice, and then, only cursorily.
8 3
The same is true of the dissent by Justice Thomas joined by Justice
Scalia.
Justice Thomas castigates the majority for departing from strict
scrutiny, charging them with employing a "sui generis test to balance
74. Id. at 405.
75. Id. at 404.
76. Id. at 405-06 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 406.
78. Id. at 407.
79. Id. at 408.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 409-10.
83. See id. at 405-10.
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away First Amendment freedoms."84 In Justice Thomas' view, "the
majority's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limits rests
upon Buckley's discounting of the First Amendment interests at stake."85
He claims that "the Court makes no effort to justify its deviation from
the tests we traditionally employ in free speech cases. 86 The result is
"the Court's ad hoc balancing away of First Amendment rights."87
In Justice Thomas' view, "[p]olitical campaigns are largely candi-
date focused and candidate driven," so voters are better served by mak-
ing contributions to candidates than by making expenditures on their
own.88 To Justice Thomas, "[c]ampaign organizations offer a ready-
built, convenient means of communicating for donors wishing to support
and amplify political messages."89 Justice Thomas also asserts that,
"[b]y depriving donors of their right to speak through the candidate, con-
tribution limits relegate donors' points of view to less effective modes of
communication."9 Where this leaves voters who want to speak inde-
pendently is not addressed. If elections are about candidates, then voters
have such a limited role that voters need not be considered. To Justice
Thomas, all speech cases are the same. There are no election cases in
the area of campaign finance, only speech cases. Voters have not been
included as speakers with First Amendment rights in this approach.
C. Including the Voters in Campaigns, Elections, and Governance in
McConnell v. FEC
The Court again considered the same issues it had addressed in
Buckley and Nixon when it upheld the major provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)9 1 in McConnell.9 2 This contro-
versial opinion located campaign finance in disputes over democracy,
governance, and the role of ordinary people as voters and participants in
the public policy process rather than in doctrinal disputes or unilateral
assertions of rights by candidates or contributors. It is grounded in theo-
ries of participation, representation, and association. Its topic is consti-
tuting legitimate government authority through electoral participation. It
treats campaign finance, and thus campaigns, as part of the election and
84. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 412.
86. Id. at 421.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 415-16.
89. Id. at 416.
90. Id. at 418.
91. Pub. L. No. 107-55, 116 Stat. 81 (scattered primarily in sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
92. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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voters as participants in both. In sum, McConnell presents a theory of
democracy grounded in the constitutional role of voters.
The majority opinion, which was written jointly by Justice Stevens
and Justice O'Connor, is based on the premise that cynicism about the
legitimacy of government undermines democracy. It also is based upon
the premise that certain forms of campaign finance, and their use to buy
or sell access to the public policy process, fuel this kind of corrosive
public cynicism. The sale of access by public officeholders and candi-
dates for public office undermines representation because so few can
afford the "access fee" in the form of soft-money contributions to politi-
cal parties. Furthermore, those who can afford the access fee tend to
give to both political parties, which might make representatives of either
party more responsive to the contributors than to the voters. For this
reason, the majority conceived of corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption far more broadly than a payment for a quid pro quo benefit, and
rejected "this crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the appear-
ance of corruption."93 The majority stated that its position was not
based on "mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone,"
but that, "it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal
candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of
undue influence."94
In formulating its analysis, the majority in McConnell located the
constitutional issues in the specific context of elections as set forth in the
voluminous fact record in this case. The majority found that the narrow
view of corruption "ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities
of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation."95 The
majority found that in seeking to curb corruption and the appearance of
corruption, "Congress is not required to ignore historical evidence
regarding a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its
context." 96 The Court observed:
Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of
access is the suggestion that money buys influence. It is no surprise
93. Id. at 152.
94. Id. at 153-54.
95. Id. at 152. The entire fact record is available in electronic form from the Campaign Legal
Center in Washington, D.C. See The Campaign Legal Center: BCRA McCain-Feingold, http://
campaignlegalcenter.org/BCRA.html (follow "Internal Political Party Documents" hyperlink;
"Witness Depositions and Cross Examinations" hyperlink; and "Witness Reports & Declarations"
hyperlink).
The majority opinion referred repeatedly and extensively to the fact record, while the
dissenting opinions made far fewer references to it. No one has ever satisfactorily explained why
those seeking to overturn BCRA chose not to develop an affirmative fact record supporting their
position.
96. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153.
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then that the purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they
are seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not unwarranted
for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the
appearance of corruption.97
In sum, the Court found that how money is raised is directly related to
how the government operates, and cynicism about-the financing of elec-
toral campaigns fuels cynicism about democracy. The problem arises
from the sale of access by candidates, officeholders, and political par-
ties. The solution is to sever the link between campaign contributions
and undue access. This requires that both direct and indirect means of
selling access be addressed.
The Court in McConnell took the position that directly translating
differentials in economic power into differentials in access to the public
policy process was corrosive of democracy. The majority regarded this
point as so important that the majority opinion began by quoting former
Secretary of State Elihu Root's observation that the use of wealth to
elect public officials who would serve the interests of the wealthy was
"'a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confi-
dence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political
institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the
foundation of our Government."' 98 The Court noted that Congress "has
repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root's judgment."99 Based on
this history of legislative attention to the issue of differential wealth and
its implications for differential policy access, the Court concluded that
"Congress' historical concern with the 'political potentialities of wealth'
and their 'untoward consequences for American democratic process,'
has long reached beyond corporate money."
1°°
The dissents in McConnell raise many of the doctrinal points raised
in the dissents in Nixon,'01 but do not consider the majority's emphasis
on the role of voters in the constitutional scheme. Instead, the dissenters
focus on First Amendment doctrine and standards of review without
considering whether campaigns and elections require a distinctive bal-
ancing of interests.
Justice Scalia, in one of the more memorable observations from
McConnell, finds that "[t]his is a sad day for the freedom of speech."
10 2
His dissent describes BCRA as "a law that cuts to the heart of what the
First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the govern-
97. Id. at 154.
98. Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
101. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
102. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248.
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ment." 0 3 He would eliminate any limits on corporate speech and rely
on disclosure provisions to inform the public of the source of the funds
used to pay for particular campaign messages." Justice Scalia does not
address the multiple limitations on disclosure or the use of entities that
are not subject to the disclosure rules to circumvent the disclosure
requirements. Instead, he simply invokes the good sense of the Ameri-
can people and expresses confidence that they will sort everything out
without the limitations on corporate speech.
Justice Thomas describes BCRA as "the most significant abridge-
ment of the freedoms of speech and association since the Civil War."' 5
Much of his dissent addresses the appropriate level of scrutiny in First
Amendment cases, and he decries what he describes as "the steady
decrease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political
speech."" ° Justice Thomas' dissent is noteworthy for his position, alone
among the Justices, opposing disclosure of funding sources, and
expressly rejecting any right voters might claim to the information dis-
closed under BCRA.' °7 Based on this position, it is a fair inference that
Justice Thomas would find no basis in the first sentence of the Constitu-
tion for voters' claims to information or to equal access to the public
policy process.
Justice Kennedy's dissent was a sweeping dissent from the trends
he found in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,08 Nixon,
and McConnell. He took direct aim at the majority's analysis of corrup-
tion, stating that "[bly equating vague and generic claims of favoritism
or influence with actual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a defi-
nition of corruption that dismantles basic First Amendment rules
.... 109 Justice Kennedy finds that differential access based on the size
of political contributions poses no problem for democratic government.
Indeed, he argues the opposite, asserting that "[d]emocracy is premised
on responsiveness."110 Justice Kennedy finds no reason to pause to con-
sider whether responsiveness to money or whether calibrating the
degree, scope, or nature of responsiveness to the amount of money
received might differ from responsiveness to voters casting ballots even
if they do not make campaign contributions. To Justice Kennedy, only a
narrowly defined form of corruption in which the money contributed can
103. Id.
104. Id. at 248-49.
105. Id. at 264.
106. Id. at 272.
107. Id. at 275-77.
108. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
109. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296.
110. Id. at 297.
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be linked directly to specific favorable treatment can be treated as a "bad
form of responsiveness" and one which "presents a justiciable standard
with a relatively clear limiting principle .... II In the absence of clear
and direct evidence of this kind of link between money and outcomes,
Justice Kennedy never considers the emphasis in the majority opinion on
differential access to the policy process or the role of voters in cam-
paigns and elections. In this approach, the First Amendment exists in
isolation from the remainder of the Constitution.
Controversies between the majority and the dissents, as well as
controversies among commentators, 1 2 suggests that future cases will
revisit these issues and that the controversy between those who find the
First Amendment invariable and those who find the First Amendment
contextual in the balances made among various interests will continue
for some time. Putting voters first can be achieved by remembering that
Congress's historical concern with the "political potentialities of wealth"
and their "untoward consequences for American democratic process...
has long reached beyond corporate money."
l1 3
IV. PUT TING VOTERS FIRST IN DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR
CONTINUING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
If voters are to play an active role in representative governance,
rights of association need to find practical expression in organizations
that facilitate such participation. The issue here is whether organizations
that are controlled by candidates or large contributors or professional
managers appointed by self-perpetuating boards of directors, or that
have no meaningful concept of membership and no defined roles for
members, can facilitate the kind of participation implicated in the con-
cept of consent set forth in the first sentence of the Constitution. The
references to First Amendment rights of association in the campaign
finance cases hardly address the role of voters as members of the organi-
zations through which they are alleged to participate in campaigns and
elections.
The United States has been famously described as "a nation of join-
ers."1"4 More recent scholarship has questioned whether this description
still applies.' 15 Few civic associations have members with voting rights
that allow them to elect the board of directors or play a role in defining
111. Id.
112. See the comments of Trevor Potter and Robert Bauer in this Symposium Issue.
113. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
114. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129-34 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Sever & Francis 1864) (1850).
115. See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN
AMERICAN CiVIC LIFE (2003).
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organizational policy. The result has been the unfettered power of
organization managers operating without meaningful guidance or
restraint from unaccountable boards. This has had unfortunate results
ranging from loss of focus on the organizational mission to outright cor-
ruption in the form of self-dealing and self-enrichment.' 16 In response,
the Senate Finance Committee launched an examination of tax-exempt
entities focused on issues of governance.117
There has been no similar examination of the functioning of politi-
cal parties, leaving many questions unanswered. Is the right of associa-
tion in the context of a political party limited to the right to contribute
money to that party? What does the right of association mean when
special interests have been shown to contribute to both parties to pre-
serve access to the public policy process? What roles do voters play in
political parties? What does it mean to be a member of a political party?
What claims can voters make with respect to these roles?
The jurisprudence of association offers virtually no basis for claims
by members of political parties in any context, and certainly none in the
context of elections. Most cases have dealt with the authority of organi-
zation managers to exclude various categories of Americans from their
organizations. The most recent of these cases allowed the Boy Scouts to
exclude an Eagle Scout from a troop leader position on the grounds that
his open acknowledgment of his homosexuality is inconsistent with the
mission of the Boy Scouts."' The Court devoted no attention to the
First Amendment associational rights of members or potential members.
The issue of First Amendment associational rights has arisen in the
116. Congress has focused on the implications of these concerns for continued exemption from
federal income taxation. Hearings on The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report of
Investigations and Proposals for Reform Before the S. Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2005)
(focusing on misuse of funds by the Nature Conservancy); Hearing on Charities and Charitable
Reform Before the S. Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (demonstrating concerns about lack of
accountability and transaparency); Hearing on Tax Exempt Organizations Before the H. Comm.
On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (inquiring into rationales for exemption; testimony from
author). Exempt organizations themselves have indicated that they share these concerns and are
seeking ways to ensure accountability and transparency in exempt organizations. See PANEL ON
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
(2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/PanelFinalReport.pdf. Contemporary
scandals underscore the importance of the academic theories of emphasizing the need for
increased accountability and transparency in exempt organizations. See Henry Hansmann, The
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from the Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L.J.
54 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497
(1981); see also Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency: Designing a
Nondiversion Constraint, 56 SMU L. REV. 675 (2003).
117. See Senate Fin. Comm., Senate Finance Issues Discussion Draft on Reforms for EOs, 103
TAX NOTES 120-28 (2004).
118. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 654 (2000).
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context of elections only in cases dealing with the use of treasury funds
of organizations to make contributions or independent expenditures,'19
and in cases dealing with how political action committees connected to
unions and corporations may collect money for election activity.' 20 The
roles and rights of voters in political parties have been considered only
in the context of access to voting in party primaries, not in terms of
access to participation in political party governance.' 2'
Controversies over the rights of voters as members of politically
active advocacy organizations and political parties raise the question of
how limitations on the rights of members to define the policies of such
organizations, including decisions about using treasury funds to influ-
ence the outcomes of elections, can be reconciled with putting voters
first. While the Court has taken steps repeatedly to protect members of
advocacy organizations from the kind of compelled speech represented
by the use of an organization's treasury funds to support or oppose a
candidate for public office, 12 2 the Court has also defined a very limited
exception applicable to a narrowly defined category of advocacy organi-
zations permitted to use their treasury funds to make independent
expenditures but not to make contributions to candidates or political par-
ties or other political committees.
In 1986, the Court held in FEC v. Massachussetts Citizens for Life,
119. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that using members' contributions to the general
treasury of an advocacy organization impermissibly burdens members' First Amendment
associational rights. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982); Austin v.
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146
(2003). The Court will consider yet another claim that advocacy organizations should be
permitted to use their general treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications" under 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2), which requires corporations to finance such electioneering communications
with funds from a separate segregated account. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1581 (S.
Ct. filed Nov. 14, 2005). The author filed an amicus brief in support of Appellee, Federal Election
Commission.
120. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 199-200 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A-C)
requiring that only certain persons with a defined relationship to a membership organization can
be solicited for contribution to the separate segregated fund (commonly known as a Political
Action Committee, or PAC) controlled by the organization); see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154-
56. The Court has also held unions' use of nonmembers' agency fees for election campaign
activities violates the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) as well as the
nonmembers' rights under the First Amendment. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988).
121. Ca. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (upholding a political party's right to
prohibit nonmembers from voting in the party's primary and striking down California's statute
requiring blanket primary elections open to any person regardless of party affiliation but limiting
the choice to that party's nominees for all offices); see also Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029
(2005) (upholding Oklahoma's semi-closed primaries open only to members of the party and to
voters registered as independents).
122. See supra notes 119-120.
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Inc. (MCFL)'2 3 that a nonprofit, nonstock corporation could use its trea-
sury funds to pay for a newsletter urging the readers to support candi-
dates for public office who opposed women's right to choose.'24 The
issue was not the content of the message, which is protected under the
First Amendment, but whether the funding of the message with the
organization's treasury money violated the FECA ban on use of corpo-
rate treasury funds to make an expenditure in connection with any fed-
eral election.125 The Court held unanimously that the expenditure had
violated this provision of FECA, and that the provision was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the organization in this case.
126
MCFL was a nonprofit corporation that did not accept contributions
from business corporations or labor unions, and did not itself engage in
any trade or business activity. 27  The Court found that MCFL's
"resources [came] from voluntary donations from 'members,' and from
various fundraising activities such as garage sales, bake sales, dances,
raffles, and picnics."1 28 The Court relied on this pattern of funding to
support two propositions: first, that MCFL was not a conduit for an
expenditure by a business corporation or labor union,' 29 and second, that
MCFL's newsletter did not raise the same issue regarding the conse-
quences of concentrated wealth that motivated the prohibition on the use
of corporate and union treasury funds for campaign contributions or
expenditures. 3  The Court in McConnell applied this limited exception
to the use of treasury funds to finance electioneering communications as
well. 131 In so holding, the Court described MCFL as relating to "a care-
fully defined category of entities" and insisted that all of the organiza-
tional characteristics identified in MCFL must be satisfied by an
organization claiming to avail itself of that holding to support use of its
treasury funds for election-related expenditures.' 32 In Austin, which was
decided after MCFL but before McConnell, the Court refused to permit a
123. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
124. Id. at 241. Because the organization was a § 501(c)(4) organization for federal income
tax purposes, it was permitted to engage in some election campaign activity, provided that such
activity was not its primary activity, without losing its exempt status. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2)
(2000 & Supp. II 2002).
125. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
126. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241.
127. Id. at 263-64. As an organization exempt from federal income tax, MCFL could engage
in unrelated trade or business activity and would be taxable on its income from such activities.
Unrelated trade or business activity would jeopardize the organization's exempt status only if such
activity became its primary activity.
128. Id. at 242.
129. See id. at 264.
130. See id. at 267-68.
131. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 209-11 (2003).
132. Id. at 210-11.
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Chamber of Commerce to avail itself of the right to use treasury funds
defined in MCFL.133
Controversies over the roles of voters as members of advocacy
organizations and political parties are core controversies in the effort to
put voters first in election law. If such association rights are denied to
ordinary voters as members of advocacy organizations, voters' rights to
amplify their voices during campaigns by associating together in organi-
zations and their rights to form organizations to address public policy
issues outside the setting of election campaigns will be significantly
eroded.
V. PUTTING VOTERS FIRST: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING POWER
AND SOVEREIGNTY
Putting voters first elicits agreement more readily if it can be dis-
missed as an empty piety than if it is meant to be taken seriously as a
constitutional principle. When the idea of putting voters first is posited
as a constitutional principle, it becomes a contested assertion about legit-
imate government authority. Assertions about legitimate government
authority are assertions about power. These assertions about power are
not abstract or historical, but are instead practical and contemporary.
Putting voters first means assessing public policy processes in terms of
the scope for participation by ordinary voters, the practical operational
realities of representation as expressed in communication between voters
and elected officials, and mechanisms for ensuring that elected officials
remain accountable for their actions.
In the specific context of election law, putting voters first means
treating elections as the central mechanism for ensuring that participa-
tion, representation, and accountability are the operative realities of the
political system. Elections are defined broadly to include not simply
casting ballots or even counting ballots, but the broader process of struc-
turing the choices that appear on the ballot and the means used to per-
suade voters to make particular choices. As the McConnell Court
emphasized, financial arrangements can undermine democracy by fos-
tering cynicism among ordinary voters. Another significant part of the
process of putting voters first is ensuring that ostensibly representative
organizations such as civic associations and political parties themselves
provide broad scope for participation and themselves provide for repre-
sentation and accountability.
This is a controversial agenda. It threatens to disrupt the arrange-
ments that exclude voters from political and public policy dialogue. Put-
133. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 662 (1990).
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ting voters first requires recalibration of the dialogue between voters and
those whom they have elected. At the same time, putting voters first
also poses a challenge to voters. If voters have a constitutional role,
then the constitution imposes an obligation to play that role actively,
responsibly, and effectively. Voters have, under the Constitution, both
rights and obligations.' If we come to understand that the continued
legitimacy of government rests fundamentally on the continuing actively
expressed consent of the voters, then voters have rights to information
about candidates' plans and sources of funding. At the same time, vot-
ers have a duty to demand such information and to express their views at
the ballot box. Just as participation, representation, and accountability
represent a constellation of rights, so, too, do they represent a constella-
tion of obligations on the part of voters.
The Court's opinions in election law cases appear to address the
entire history of representative government. Some of these extended
observations, whether in majority opinions or concurring opinions or
dissenting opinions, may on first reading seem only tangentially relevant
to a particular case. Yet, if one considers these opinions over time, the
entire enterprise seems to be a very good use of judicial time. One could
suggest that the Justices are thinking about the first sentence of the Con-
stitution and its practical, operational implications for election law. Per-
haps other commentators may wish to join the discussion and participate
in shaping a jurisprudence of election law based on putting voters first.
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